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Hoefer: Corporations
CORPORATIONS
I. JUDioAuL DECIsIows
A. FraudulentConveyanoes
By far the most interesting of the corporation cases arising
in the past surveyed period is Jeffords v. Berry,' in which the
receiver of an insolvent corporation brought an action to set
aside a deed by the corporation to the defendants on the
grounds that it was a fraudulent conveyance. On January 23.
1965, the corporation, of which the plaintiff-respondent was
appointed receiver in March of 1965, conveyed to the defendantappellants certain real estate in Orangeburg. The deed recited
a consideration of 1,000 dollars which was paid. In addition,
the deed was made subject to certain mortgage indebtedness
totalling approximately 30,900 dollars, plus outstanding taxes
and other liens of record. Though the deed was taken subject
to the above described indebtedness, it was stipulated in the deed
that none of the indebtedness would be assumed by the grantees.
The referee found that the fair market value of the property
was approximately 36,000 dollars and that the value of the property over lien indebtedness was approximately 6,000 dollars.
The plaintiff alleged that the corporation grantor was insolvent at the time the deed was executed, that one of the
defendants was the attorney for the grantor, that the consideration was grossly inadequate and that the transfer was prejudicial to the rights of the creditors. The defendants alleged that
the conveyance was for valuable consideration, that they had
no information to form a belief as to the insolvency of the
corporation and further, the defendant lawyer alleged that
although he had represented the grantor from time to time, he
was not under a retainer.
The lower court affirmed the findings of the special referee
and ordered that the deed in question be set aside and cancelled.
At the heart of this controversy was the application of the
Statute of Elizabeth, 2 which reads in part:
Every... conveyance.., which may be had or made for
any intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud creditors
and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts,
1. 247 S.C. 347, 147 S.E2d 415 (1966).
2. S.C. CoDE AwN. § 57-301 (1962).
24
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accounts ...

shall be deemed and taken ...

to be clearly

and utterly void, frustrate, and of no effect ...
The leading case in this area is Gardner v. KiMrven, which
states:
Our courts, in interpreting this statute, have held that conveyances shall be set aside under two conditions: First,
where the transfer is made by the grantor with actual intent
of defrauding his creditors where that intent is imputable
to the grantee, even though there is valuable consideration;
and Second, where a transfer is made without actual intent
to defraud the grantor's creditors, but without consideration.
The lower court concluded that the deed should be set aside
because at the time of the conveyance the grantor was insolvent
and the consideration was inadequate.
In spite of this finding, the supreme court reversed on the
grounds that the consideration, while inadequate, was not
grossly inadequate. The supreme court in Jeffords relied
heavily on the Gardner test. The court reasoned that since the
deed was not without consideration, there must be actual intent
to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors on the part of the grantor
which could be imputable to the grantee. The court seemed to
ignore Rice v. City of CoZ uMla,4 relied on in the Gardner
decision, in which the court defined actual intent. The court
stated:
No rule of equity appeals more to the judicial conscience
than that which requires the assets of an insolvent corporation to be distributed ratably among creditors.... He who
claims a departure from this rule must establish his right
clearly.5
The court in Rice concluded:
They [the defendants] solemnly assert their innocence of
any intention to hinder, delay, or defraud the other creditors, as if their innocence can shield them from the presumption that they intended the natural consequences of
their acts. The equity of the creditors generally to an equal
3. 184 S.C. 37, 40, 191 S.E. 814, 816 (1937).
4. 143 S.C. 516, 141 S.E. 705 (1926).

5. Id. at 538-39, 141 S.E. at 712.
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distribution of the assets of the insolvent cannot be annihilated by such a quibble. It makes not a particle of difference that they intended simply to secure their deposits; the
effect of their acts is all that needs to be considered. If
they proved to be the means of thwarting that equity which
so appeals to the judicial conscience, they will be utterly
destroyed.(
These are strong words, and yet their effect is not evident in the
Jeffords decision. The clear implication of Rice and Gardner,
not to mention the Statute of Elizabeth itself, is that one is
presumed to know the consequences of conveying out the main
asset of an insolvent corporation for a clearly inadequate consideration, and that consequence is that creditors will be hindered, delayed or defrauded. In Jeffords, the court seems to
engage in a semantic debate over the terms "inadequate" and
"grossly inadequate" rather than dealing with the substantive
questions in the case. In the process, they have approved precisely the sort of transaction which the Statute of Elizabeth
prohibits. The Jeffords decision must be viewed as a weakening
of the protection which the Statute of Elizabeth has afforded
creditors to pro rata shares in the assets of an insolvent corporation.
B. Stock Redemption Agreements with an Insolvent Corporation
Cunningham v. Jaffe7 raises several questions in connection
with the general problem of the creditor's protected interest in
the assets of an insolvent corporation. The plaintiff, trustee
in bankruptcy of the corporation, sought to have a stock redemption agreement between the insolvent corporation and the
defendants, officers and directors of the corporation, declared
void because it impaired the capital of the corporation and
because the chairman of the board and the president had no
knowledge of the agreement. The bankrupt, a Delaware corporation, was organized in July 1962 with a paid in capital
of 50,000 dollars. It then purchased the assets of a South Carolina corporation with substantially the same name for 500,000
dollars-0,000 dollars in cash and 450,000 dollars represented
6. Id. at 543, 141 S.E. at 713.
7. 251 F. Supp. 143 (D.S.C. 1966).
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by loans. The business steadily lost money. As of March 2, 1963,
operating expenses had exhausted the capital of the corporation.
On March 9, 1963, the corporation entered into the stock redemption agreement with the defendants whereby the defendants
would sell their stock back to the corporation for 100,000 dollars
-more than twice the original purchase price.
Delaware law controlled as to the legality of the agreement.
The Delaware Code provides:
Every corporation organized under this chapter may purchase, hold, sell and transfer shares of its own capital stock;
but no such corporation shall use its funds or properties for
the purchase of its own shares when such use would cause
any impairment of the capital of the corporation.8
It is interesting to note that the South Carolina Business Corporation Act has substantially the same provision.9 If South
Carolina courts follow the reasoning of this decision, a company
will be forbidden to purchase its own capital stock when the
value of its assets is less than the total amount of shares of its
capital stock. 10 Thus, a corporation, particularly a close corporation, and corporate creditors will be protected against the
abuses of corporate power which sometimes occur as officers
or directors with a substantial financial investment in the corporation seek to desert the sinking ship by any available exit.

C. Jurisdiction
Both B ramlett v. Arthur MHuray, Inc." and Rodrique 'v. Yale
d Towne, iwn. 12 discuss the often litigated question of what
constitutes sufficient corporate contact to bring a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of our courts. Both cases restate the well known rule that there is no precise test as to what
business activities will bring a foreign corporation within the
DE. CoDE ANN. § 8-160 (1953).
9. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-15.17 (e) (Supp. 1965), provides as follows:
A corporation shall in no event purchase its own shares if the corporation is insolvent, or if such purchase or payment would render it insolvent, or would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below
the aggregate preferential amount payable in event of liquidation to the
holders of shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corpora-

8.

tion.

10. See In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255
(1914), Delaware's leading case in interpreting its stock redemption statute.

11. 250 F. Supp. 1011 (D.S.C. 1966).
12. 251 F. Supp. 73 (D.S.C. 1966).
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jurisdiction of the court. In Bramlett, the court described the
progression to the modern and more liberal concept of jurisdiction:
The early restrictive concepts of Penno-yer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, have gradually evolved into the more modern philosophy as enunciated in Interntional S oe Co. v. State ofWashington, 326 U.S. 610 (1945), that the question of
jurisdiction of foreign corporations in state or federal
courts is decided by "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Such traditional notions are adequately
met if a defendant has "minimum contacts" with the State
of South Carolina ....
13
The court cited the stringent controls exercised by the defendant
over the South Carolina franchise and concluded that, practically speaking, the studios were nothing more than a branch of
the Delaware corporation. The defendant contended that such
controls were necessary to the protection of its trade name and
trademark and were not intended to give it direct supervisory
control. Though it recognized that control was necessary to
the protection of rights in a trademark and maintenance of its
secondary meaning, the court held that it did not follow that if
these controls constituted sufficient contact to bring the foreign
corporation within the jurisdiction of the forum state, the
jurisdiction would not be invoked simply because the corporation did not intend to bring itself within that jurisdiction.
In Rodrigue, the court found that the defendants, through a
distributing agreement with a South Carolina corporation, had
established the sort of substantive contacts which would justify
maintenance of a personal injury action against it in South
Carolina courts. Under the distributing agreement, the defendant made direct shipments from its plant in Arkansas to South
Carolina customers, had direct supervision of the installation
and inspection of the equipment purchased from it and was paid
directly by the individual South Carolina customer. Szantay v.
Beeck Aircraft Corp.,"4 discussed in last year's corporations survey, 15 involved this same problem. It seems clear that in jurisdiction cases the South Carolina federal district courts will con13. Brarnlett v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (D.S.C. 1966).
14. 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965), aff'd, 349 F2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
15. 18 S.C.L. REv. 30, 32 (1966).
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holding that federal courts are bound by the state's interpretation of its service of process statutes and that such statutes will
be given the broadest construction concommitant with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
II.

GISXLATION

The only statute affecting the corporation field enacted in
this survey period is Act No. 779,17 which amends section 12-758

so as to reinstate material which was inadvertantly repealed by
the South Carolina Business Corporation Act. Old section 12101 was repealed in 1962. Part of that section contained provisions relating to the powers of charitable, social and religious
corporations. The present act simply adds the old section 12-101
material to present section 12-758, and ratifies any action taken
by such corporations in reliance on the repealed sections.
JAN M HoEMn

16. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. S.C. Acts & J. Res. 1966, p. 2057, amending S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-758
(1962).
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